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Dieterich: German 79th Reserve Infantry Division

The German 79th Reserve
Infantry Division in the
Battle of Vimy Ridge,
April 1917
Generalleutnant Alfred Dieterich,
Commander, 79th Reserve Infantry Brigade

Translation by Christopher and Ute Wilde-Linnell; Introduction by Andrew Iarocci

C

anadian narratives of the Great War rarely
give a very clear picture of the enemy. They
may mention German regiments, brigades,
divisions or corps that opposed Canadian troops
on this or that front, but detailed citations from
German sources are often missing. There are
a number of reasons for this, most notably the
scarcity of translated primary documents. A
number of comprehensive regimental histories
were published in Germany during the interwar
years, but these are often difficult to obtain and
tend to be printed in old German. Consequently,
we were glad to receive this translation of
Generalleutnant Alfred Dieterich’s report on his
brigade’s defensive operations on Vimy Ridge
during March-April 1917. Dieterich originally
published the account in Germany after the
war, and to our knowledge, this is the first time
it has appeared in English. The translation was
completed by Christopher and Ute Wilde Linnell.

In 1917 Dieterich served as the commanding
officer of the 79th Reserve Infantry Brigade,
the sole infantry brigade of the 79th Reserve
Infantry Division, one of nine second series ‘NewFormation Reserve Divisions’ created during
the winter of 1914-15.1 Its three regiments of
infantry, numbered consecutively from 261 to
263, largely comprised Prussian recruits. In
February 1915 the division was deployed in East
Prussia and fought at the Battle of the Masurian

Lakes. The 79th remained on the Eastern Front
until November 1916, when it was relieved and
transferred to the west. After a period of rest, the
division moved into the line on the la Bassée front
in early 1917, and was then redeployed further
south in the Vimy sector at the end of February.
The division was badly damaged at Vimy on 9
April, losing 1,660 men captured. Five days later
the remnants were relieved and sent to a quiet
sector of the front where the division remained
until the summer of 1917.2
In contrast with their British counterparts,
many German divisions by 1917 comprised just
one infantry brigade, along with a field artillery
regiment and a selection of ancillary divisional
troops. The German infantry brigade usually
consisted of three regiments, each of three
battalions. The meant that a German regiment
roughly equalled a British brigade. Therefore a
single German infantry brigade was about the
same size as three British brigades.
In April 1917 the three infantry regiments of
79th Reserve Division were deployed against
the northern-central portion of the Canadian
front at Vimy Ridge, opposite the 2nd, 3rd
and 4th Canadian Infantry Divisions. On the
79th Reserve Division’s left flank, just north of
Thélus, was the 263rd Reserve Infantry Regiment
(Section ‘Arnulf’). Next in line was the 262nd
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completed by surviving regimental and company
officers or NCOs. Dieterich is careful to absolve
his brigade of responsibility for the defeat, but
Generalleutnant Dieterich begins his story with
neither is the account totally unrealistic in its
a summary of key strategic developments on the
assessment of the battle’s outcome. Under the
Western Front in early 1917, including the German
weight of heavy artillery fire and strong infantry
with-drawals to the
attacks, the relatively
Hindenburg Line
shallow belt of
1917 Order of Battle
and the offensive
defences atop the
79th Reserve Infantry Division
plans of General
ridge could not hold
Robert Nivelle, the
out indefinitely, and
79th Reserve Infantry Brigade
new French Comonce the Germans
mander-in-Chief who
were pushed onto
261st Reserve Infantry Regiment
had recently replaced
the reverse slope
262nd Reserve Infantry Regiment
General Joseph
facing the wide open
263rd Reserve Infantry Regiment
Joffre. According
Douai plain, there
to Dieterich, the
3rd Squadron, 16th Hussar Regiment (cavalry)
was little option
German high combut to withdraw to
63rd Reserve Field Artillery Regiment
mand expected
a more secure line.
(nine batteries)
additional attacks in
In common with
379th Pioneer Battalion
the wake of Nivelle’s
his Canadian op (engineers, searchlight sections, trench mortars)
initial thrusts, and
ponents, although
541st Ambulance Company
the men of the 79th
perhaps to a lesser
(three field hospitals and one veterinary hospital)
Reserve Division
degree, Dieterich
worked quickly to
managed to salvage
746th Motor Transport Column
repair the relatively
something useful
shallow defences
from a battle that
atop the Vimy Ridge.
cost his division in excess of 1,600 men captured.
He offers a graphic account of 4th Canadian
As he states in his closing paragraph:
Division’s failed gas raid on 1 March,3 and then
The fierce battle over Vimy Ridge was fought to a
turns to the terrible destruction unleashed by
standstill. In the aftermath of this engagement, it
Allied artillery fire during the two weeks leading
was a high honour for any German soldier to be
up to the 9 April attack. Finally, Dieterich recounts
able to call himself a Vimy veteran…In the hearts
the ebb and flow of the four-day battle between
of the soldiers and their loved ones thrives the
his troops and the Canadian Corps, focussing
memory of those heroic days and deep sorrow of
loss at Vimy Ridge, that patch of earth sanctified
on the inability of German counterattacks to
by the rivers of noble blood and glorious graves.
dislodge the enemy from newly won positions
along the ridge.
Dieterich’s romantic language is typical of
German regimental histories. He is careful to
emphasize that his troops fought bravely against
the steepest odds, and is especially bold in his
descriptions of noble struggles down to the last
cartridge and hand grenade. In several instances,
he names individual junior officers who sacrificed
themselves in last ditch attempts to stem the
Canadian tide. At the same time, a certain
degree of detachment is evident in the narrative.
Dieterich could not have personally witnessed
much of what he describes. The combat narrative
is clearly organized according to each regiment,
so Dieterich likely based his account on reports

Library and Archives Canada (LAC) PA 882.

(Section ‘Zollern’), and on the right was the 261st
Regiment (Section ‘Fischer’).

Notes
1.
2.

3.

Handbook of the German Army in War, January 1917
(Menston: EP Publishing, 1973), p.28.
Intelligence Section of the General Staff, American
Expeditionary Forces, Chaumont, Histories of the Two
Hundred and Fifty-One Divisions of the German Army
Which Participated in the War (1914-1918) (Washington:
United States War Office, 1920), pp.537-539.
For more on the raid see Tim Cook, “A Proper Slaughter:
The March 1917 Gas Raid at Vimy Ridge,” Canadian
Military History, Volume 8, Number 2, Spring 1999,
pp.7-23.
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Dieterich’s Account:
The General Position
of the German Western Front

I

n Spring 1917, the German Army High
Command, anticipating the forthcoming
French and English General Offensive, decided
to save on Reserves by shortening their Western
Front line from the protruding Bulge of ArrasRoye-Soissons into a newly-built front line, the
“Siegfried Stellung” (Hindenburg line), and at
the same time devastate the area between the
old and new lines. This would take the ground
away from the forthcoming French and English
general offensive, as well as enabling, at the same
time, a strong reserve to be separated and created
through the considerable shortening of the front
lines. So in the middle of March when the French
and English were ready to launch their long
prepared attack against the Bulge, they found
to their surprise the German front had slipped
away and had been pulled back behind a wildly
devastated area, which for the next while ruled
out any further offensives.
In their Operations plans, the German High
Command had to reckon that the Allies, after the
failure of the first General Offensive, would direct
further offensives against the flanks adjoining the
Front to the north and south of the devastated
area, and thereby try to lift the strong Hindenburg
Line off its hinges at its wings.

North of the Hindenburg Line lay the key point
in the German front line at Vimy Ridge (a ridge
that, in the north was often steep and in the south
gently sloped eastwards). The German front line
ran west of the towns of Givenchy, Vimy and
Farbus. In the possession of the enemy, it would
offer a wide view east to the Douai plain. This
important ridge could only be defended by highly
reliable troops during the forthcoming General
Offensive. It was entrusted to the 79th Reserve
Division.

Deployment of the 79th Reserve
Division into the Vimy Position

T

he Division had arrived from the Eastern
Front at the beginning of December 1916,
after the conclusion of long and glorious battles.
They had just gone through several weeks of
training near Lille, under the leadership of the
General of the Infantry von Bacmeister, and had
learned to master the peculiarities of the battle
tactics of the Western Front. Now they were
awaiting deployment near la Bassée and Lens.
Since the end of February 1917, they had been
stationed between Givenchy and Thélus in the
cratered terrain of Vimy Ridge and were trying
hard to reinforce the shot-up and collapsed
trenches for the expected battle.

Canadians survey the landscape around a captured
German emplacement near the village of Thélus, April
1917.
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The right wing of the Division, “Section Fischer”
was over three kilometres wide and had the
Reserve Infantry Regiment (Res. Inf. Regt.) 261
(Colonel-Lieutenant von Goerne). The middle
“Section Zollern,” was for the Res. Inf. Regt. 262
(Major Baron von Rotenhan) and the left wing,
“Section Arnulf,” entrusted to the Res. Inf. Regt.
263 (Colonel-Lieutenant von Behr).
In each Regiment two Battalions were deployed
for battle, and one Battalion kept back for the
use of the higher commanders.
The difficulty for the defence was the shallow
depth of the position of only 700-1000 metres.
If the attacker was able to push the defender
off the small ridge in their first onslaught, then
the re-capture by a counterattack was unlikely.
On top of the ridge the first position had three
insufficiently planned lines whose shelters, which
mostly lay mistakenly in the first line, could not
withstand any heavy calibre bombardment. The
second position was out of the question for a
longer defence, due to its unfavourable position
at the foot of the eastern slope.

The batteries of the Division Artillery commander,
Colonel Bleidorn, found covered positions out
of sight to the east of the strung out ridge. The
close range artillery, the 63rd Reserve Field
Artillery Regiment, and the 2nd section of the
69th Field Artillery Regiment under Major Cropp,
was divided according to the Infantry Regiment
Sections into three sub-groups of four field
batteries each. Subgroup Arnulf was further
strengthened by one piece Field-H Battery. With it
came several dug-in close range pieces of artillery
supporting the position of the 1st infantry. The
long-range artillery of Major Kemmer was divided
into 2 subgroups consisting of 9 batteries: 3
pieces of Field-H, 4 mortars, and 2 pieces of
direct fire batteries. Observation points were
offered to all batteries on the Vimy Ridge, but
the space was crowded and therefore often under
heavy fire.
Work was necessary to build the position into
a condition capable for defending against the
expected attack; this strained all parts of the
Division to the limit, including the resting troops
and the medical formations. In spite of the enemy’s
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lively harassing fire, constant work continued
on the re-enforcement of the position, on the
renovation of the shot-up trenches, the building
of new gallery-tunnels and re-enforcement of
wire obstacles. Convoy roads for the nightly
deliveries of Reserves needed to be established,
the Regiment and Battalion command posts had
to be supplied with aircraft signalling sheets that
had to be laid out on the approach of German
ground attack aircraft to show them where they
had to drop orders or reports. Because the
deployment of the Division shifted the borders
of the Sections, new Command Posts had to be
built for the 261st Regiment’s staff at the Forgery
north of Vimy, for the 262nd Regiment’s staff in
the trench of the 2nd position, and for the 263rd
Regiment’s staff on the east slope of Vimy Ridge.
Staff of the Artillery Combat Group joined the
Infantry Regiment Staff. One Brigade Command
Post1 was placed at the road junction east of
Vimy as well for the long-range Artillery Combat
Group nearby.
Deployed to the left and next to the 79th Reserve
Division, between Thélus and the Scarpe, were
the 1st Bavarian Reserve Division and the 14th
Bavarian Infantry Division. These two divisions,
along with the 79th Reserve Division, formed
Group Vimy, part of the 1st Bavarian Corps
under General of the Infantry von Fassbender.
The Division of Group Arras (IX Reserve Corps)
joined south of the Scarpe and over the ridge
terrain of Wancourt and Queant. To the right of
the 79th Reserve Division, in the ruins of Angres
and Givenchy, the 16th Bavarian Infantry Division
of the Group Souchez (VIII Reserve Corps) was
awaiting the attack.
Behind those Groups and subordinate to the
Army High Command, were several Divisions
in Reserve, in the area east of Douai-Cambrai, a
total of nine divisions by 9 April.

Canadian Advance on 1 March 1917

T

he 79th Reserve Division had hardly settled
in their new position when on 1 March an
attempt was made to gain the Vimy Ridge through
a surprise advance of strong forces from the
opposing Canadian Divisions. The goal of the
assault was aimed against the northern part of
the Ridge, which being hardly 700 meters deep,
was the fastest to be broken through. A short

but overwhelming Artillery barrage tried to force
down the defenders in the front trenches and also
targetted the batteries in and around Vimy which
were soon enveloped in poisonous clouds of gas.
Especially heavy was the fire of the attacker in
the district north of Vimy where in a short time
3 guns of a battery of the 63rd Reserve Field
Artillery Regiment were destroyed.
At 0400 hours artificial fog spread over the battle
lines of the defender. At the same time dense
masses of Canadians rose out of their stand-to
positions. Wave after wave broke against the
German positions focussed on the trenches of
the 261st Regiment, but also overlapping on
the right onto the section of the 16th Bavarian
Rifle Infantry Division and left onto the 262nd
Regiment. Flares went up everywhere and a
counter-barrage was fired by our guns. They
fought with the utmost strain as far as they
were still fit for action, but they did not have the
strength to dam the storm of the attacker. But
the rifles and machine guns in the front trenches
and shell-holes were tensed and on the lookout.
The ones that deserve the honour of the day
before all others were the 2nd, 4th, 9th, and 11th
Companies of the 261st. Their fire mowed down
the dense masses of the storming Canadians.
The attack broke down in front of the wire. A
repeat attack at 0600 hours met the same fate.
Only on the right, at the Bavarian position did
the Canadians force an entry. But a powerful
counterattack by sections of the 1st Battalion
261st quickly restored the situation. The enemy
gave up further attacks. He had bitten on iron
and knew who his opponent was. Hundreds of
Canadians lay dead in no-man’s-land. But the
defender had to mourn a good many dead and
many wounded as well. In this battle, the first
officer of the Division on the Western Front,
Lieutenant Lieser of the 261st Regiment, found
his heroic death.
Two days after this battle the Canadians asked for
a ceasefire to remove their dead. It was granted
chivalrously by the German commanders. The
3rd and 4th of March witnessed a sight perhaps
never before seen in the World War, how, after a
hard fought battle, the comrades, undisturbed
by the foe, carried their dead on stretchers
from the battlefield to bury them behind their
lines – an occurrence among many others which
shows how the German warrior has preserved
73
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On 5 March the battle activity started again.
With the clearing weather one could see far into
the enemy rear from the crest of Vimy Ridge.
The Arras-Souchez road stretching parallel to
the front, the Loretto Ridge and the ruins of the
villages Souchez, Carency & Neuville-St. Vaast
were clearly recognisable. Soon the weather
turned again. After mild spring weather, it turned
cold. Drifting snow alternated with pouring rain
so that trenches and craters filled with water.

Preparatory Artillery Battle

S

ince the end of March the English were
massing divisions of their 3rd and 4th Armies
opposite the German 6th Army on both sides
of Arras. The main focus of their attack shifted
to their left wing, which would break through
between Souchez and Quéant over the steep edge
of Vimy and along the banks of the rivers Scarpe
and Cambrai – with the distant destination of
Mons. At the same time they were opening fire
with thousands of artillery pieces and mortars
onto the German front lines, and supported by the
destructive fire of numerous bomber squadrons.
This soon put the fire of the Somme battle far
into the shade.2 To a great extent this destroyed
the positions north and south of the Scarpe and
enveloped the German batteries and sometimes
also the infantry positions in poisonous gas
clouds. The ridge between Givenchy and Farbus
was exposed to the heaviest fire. In the first days
of the artillery battle, it was roughly possible to
ascertain the strength of the English artillery fire
(the number of shells descending on the 79th
Reserve Division was between 12-15,000) the
counting was later impossible after the fire was
reinforced. The main strength of the fire on this
Division was at first aimed at Section Fischer, but
the barrage was later concentrated with greater
force on Section Arnulf.
Since the end of March even villages and
roads located far to the rear were suffering
under English artillery fire. The inhabitants of
threatened villages were moved to the rear after
several French citizens lost their lives through
this. The observation balloon anchorage near
Acheville also was often the target of English
artillery fire.

Since the beginning of April, there existed no
more possibility of repairing destruction caused
by the bombardment. Through the effect of heavy
artillery in concert with the predominantly wet
weather, the positions were soon transformed
into a crater-field of thick mud, in which only a
few shelters escaped destruction. Only a small
amount of munitions, material or rations moved
up to the front, taking the strength of one man
for one night. Enormous difficulties also arose
under these circumstances for the supply of
the artillery ammunition. The 8-horse ‘Protzen’
artillery transport wagon with mounted Protzcase to hold necessary munitions could not get
through. The heavy shells had to be dragged
forward a great distance by manpower. In spite
of this, not only were the daily needs supplied
(and some days the artillery of the Division used
up to 2,000 rounds) but also enough munitions
for the defence of the coming major attack was
stored at the firing positions. Although the
constantly shot up long distance telephone lines
were supplemented by radio and light signal
posts (even the cables buried two metres deep
were constantly destroyed from hits) the firing
effect of our artillery was constantly interrupted
through the destruction of the Battery Posts and
connections.

LAC PA 1063

sympathy and a sense of chivalry in the horrors
of the World War.

The numerically superior strength of the English
fighter squadrons was also felt, but if they
attacked our fighter pilots, especially the wellknown red triplane of Baron von Richthofen, they
always retreated in tatters and lost 50 aircraft
shot down in the last eight days before the big
attack.
Every night the soldiers of both sides were kept
in suspense through raiding operations, which
brought the 79th Reserve Division the odd bit of
important news about the enemy, while similar
attempts by the enemy were repelled.
Underground, the war also surged to and fro.
German sharpshooters immediately occupied
mine craters that were blasted by German
miners.
The losses of soldiers and material visibly
multiplied at the beginning of April. Immediately
before Easter, it was possible for the first time to
deploy the fighting strength of the 79th Reserve
Division battalions into a solid position in the
front. The following situation was generally the
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British gunfire falls on Vimy Ridge, April 1917.

case: in the 1st and 2nd lines there were 1 to 2
companies, and 1 to 2 companies behind that as
a security force for the 3rd line, the rest stayed in
reserve for the battalion commander. The trench
strength of the companies varied between 50 and
90 riflemen. This shrunk considerably before the
beginning of the big attack. Since the battalion
reserves had shrunk down to a few groups
because of Messenger posts, the Division had a
company move forward into the battle zone from
each reserve battalion immediately before the
major battle, where they stayed with the Infantry
Pioneer Companies as a weak reserve for the
regiment. At the end of March, six machine guns
of Machine-Gun Section 20 were deployed, and
with the other machine guns hidden deeply in
the cratered landscape. In conjunction with the
few still operable mortars, they formed the solid
skeleton of the very thinly manned positions.
The superior strength of the attackers in material
was overpowering. From English reports it
is possible to gather that they were firing
140 artillery pieces and 50 mortars on every
kilometer of the attack front north of the Scarpe.
This reveals that the 79th Reserve Division
was exposed to the effect of over 400 artillery
pieces and 150 mortars, for which they could
only counter with 89 artillery pieces and few
mortars, many of which were destroyed during
the artillery battle by the superior strength of

the enemy fire. No wonder that our soldiers in
the firing trenches had the experience that they
were without protection and at the mercy of the
enemy’s destructive fire.
It became increasingly difficult with the alldestroying enemy fire to bring supplies to the
forward lines. The soldiers could often only rely
on bread and water, which they scooped out of the
gas- and feces-contaminated shell holes. There
also occurred, wherever there was mining activity
under the ground, the nerve shattering feeling of
standing on unstable ground. Thus the strength
and morale of the troops visibly declined.
On 6 April the 6th Army High Command received
the order, from the Army Group Crown Prince
Rupprecht, to draw the divisions destined for
the first relief of the Front Divisions closer to
the threatened stretch Angres-Wancourt. The
march to the front of these divisions, however,
were delayed in such a manner that on 9 April
they were not yet in position to be able to launch
a counterattack.
On 7 April the enemy artillery fire eased off
noticeably, although on the afternoon of the 8th
(Easter Sunday) it swelled again into a heavy
barrage, which carried on throughout the night
with varying strength. It was the warm up.
75
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General Attack and Deep
Breakthrough South of Thélus

A

t 0530 hours on the morning of 9 April, in
the damp, cold and gray pre-dawn light,
a hailstorm of iron such as nobody had ever
experienced fell on the German positions. Its
racket equalled the roaring and raging of a
hurricane-lashed sea. Everywhere rose huge
fountains of earth. The ground seemed to shake.
While the forward lines were hit predominantly by
light artillery and mortars, supported by machine
gun fire, the rear lines and artillery batteries
were hit with medium, heavy and super heavy
fire and covered with gas. The thick smoke over
the German lines grew to dark clouds, which
radiated like red embers. Shallow fire flew far
over the roads where approaching Reserves
were expected. Yellow flares rose on all parts of
the German front. Though before all of the gun
batteries could launch their barrage, the iron hail
on the forward lines lessened and with increased
strength leaps heaved onto deeper targets. Even
the machine gun bursts which had been combing

the most forward German breastworks had lifted.
On many parts of the front the ground opened up
with a crash as a result of underground mines.
Simultaneously, while icy wind and snowstorm
hit the churned up fields, the rested, excellently
fed and clothed English Attack Divisions rose
out of their trenches and craters, to storm the
German positions. In the front were grenadiers
armed with pistols; behind them in ever new
thick waves, riflemen with their weapons
hanging, a large spade in hand. Where, through
the preparatory barrage and exploding mines all
resistance was extinguished, the German lines
were quickly flooded. But, where German guns
and machine guns were still firing the attack
was stopped, and the dead piled high. Where
ammunition and grenades ran out or muddy
machine guns gave up the job, they fought with
bayonets.
Between Thélus and Wancourt masses of
tanks rolled forward over the numerous roads
branching out from Arras and the German first

A Canadian soldier takes a breather (left) as two officers examine a captured German M1913 15 cm (5.9-inch) ‘long
howitzer’ in a well-constructed concrete emplacement. The cylindrical wicker baskets strewn about at left were protective
shipping containers for artillery rounds.
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and second lines were taken on the Arras-Douai
road and also in part of the third line in the
Scarpe valley. Across from Arras an almost totally
exposed 12-kilometre-wide gap developed quite
early which gradually was closed in a makeshift
fashion by the storming Reserves moving to the
neighbouring unscathed sections. The arrival of
the reserve divisions from the rear could not be
counted on before 10 April.

Battle for Vimy Ridge

N

LAC PA 978

orth of Thélus, the English attack roared
with its strongest might. While on Vimy
Ridge the regiments of the 79th Reserve Division
awaited the attack in tense anticipation. Deployed
against us were four of the best English attack
divisions – the Canadians.
On the left wing of the Division in the forward
trenches of the 268th Reserve Infantry Regiment,
with their machine guns destroyed, only a
few were fighting fit. They were overwhelmed
in a hand-grenade battle only after stubborn
resistance. Standing high up on the breastwork
of his trench, Lieutenant Runge, the leader of
11th Company fell in close combat with many
other comrades. There was persistant resistance
in the 2nd line. The fire of the 12th Company
and from parts of the 10th Company brought
the assault of the Canadians to a stop; and from
the rear charged the reserve platoon of the 10th
Company under Vice-Sergeant Borcherding from
the ‘Felsenkeller’ through the craters towards
the front, in order to strengthen the resistance
of the comrades. South of les Tilleuls the deep
breakthrough of the English was gradually
successful, it also had its effect on Section Arnulf.
Dense masses of English advanced along the
Arras-Lens road, pressed forward against the
flanks and rear of the 263rd, rolled over them
from the south and encircled them at the rear.
There were heaps of dead and injured in the
German ranks. At the head of the 4th and 10th
Companies respectively, Lieutenants Patscheck
and Korb fell in brave resistance. Also the
enthusiastic Lieutenant Zipp who sped to the
front from his intermediate position with his
machine gun was hit by a deadly shot. In his
vicinity Lieutenant Hitzschke found his heroic
death as he sought to dam the enemy break-in
with his mortar. Death had a rich harvest. The
first position became impossible to hold. With it

went the stretched intermediate position of the
Regiment from Thélus to Vimy. There, the close
support artillery fired 20 minutes more, and
then fell silent. None of the gunners returned to
their firing. In the last hour, the leader of the 1st
Battalion, Major Meyer, was still able to break
through to the embankment with his staff.
In the meantime the Regimental Commander,
Colonel von Behr, with his reserve of the 8th
Company and the rest of the Infantry Pioneer
Company, took up an absorbing position south of
Vimy. Here the onslaught was resisted for hours,
until the heroic death of the leader of the 8th
Company, Lieutenant von Rohrscheidt, and many
other courageous fighters of a unit weakened to
its limits. The remaining fighters together with a
Deputy Officer and his five men withdrew to the
rail embankment south of the road underpass
Vimy-Acheville where reinforcements had arrived.
In the meantime little pockets of resistance had
stood firm and only after a long fight were taken
by the English. In the “Felsenkeller” Captains
Gueinzius and Schmidt-Eberstein with the
Staff of the 2nd and 3rd Battalions put up a
desperate fight in the hope of being relieved by a
counterattack. The staff of the 2nd Battalion had
been relieved in the morning and was held up
by a gas alarm and the latest incoming barrage.
One man after another fell or was rendered unfit
for combat and one machine gun after another
was destroyed. In the face of an overwhelming
grenade attack, the last defenders were pushed
into the “Felsenkeller,” where the fighting
continued for the only undestroyed entrance.
Two soldiers with rifles and hand-grenades
held a fearless guard. A waiting comrade would
immediately replace whichever entrance guard
fell or was wounded. But the numbers that were
still able to fight continued to dwindle. After two
men at the entrance simultaneously fell and their
replacements were slow to react, the attackers
got lucky and forced their way in. However,
the invaders were thrown out in an energetic
hand-grenade attack by Captains Gueinzius and
Schmidt-Eberstein. Thus the fight continued
for hours, although many of the injured lying
in the basement were threatened by suffocation
caused by poisonous smoke grenades, which
were thrown down an air vent by the English.
Only towards 1130 hours, when the last German
grenade was thrown and every possibility of
timely reinforcement had totally disappeared,
did the rest of the defenders decide with heavy
77
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A Canadian officer explores a battered German shelter in Farbus Wood, April 1917. A network of German gun
emplacements and underground shelters were concealed in the wood.

hearts to surrender. After brave opposition, the
resistance of Section Arnulf was overcome.
In Section Zollern, defended by the Reserve
Infantry Regiment 262, the attack of the English
through massive mine explosions extinguished
the last lives there. At other points, the remaining
resistance of the few surviving fighters lasted
temporarily. Only in front of the third line were
the charging attackers forced to halt. Already they
withdrew from the murderous fire of the 262nd,
as from the south came new groups of defenders to
hold and counterattack. Lieutenant Niekutowski
at the head of the 6th Company fell in defiant
resistance with many brave grenadiers of the
2nd Battalion. Also Lieutenant Wilcke was killed,
next to him many brave Fusiliers. Small isolated
pockets of resistance held out temporarily. Other
battle groups broke out to bring news of the
imminent loss of the first position. The leaders of

the combat battalions - the Fusilier and 2nd - sent
in their weak reserves, the 10th and parts of the
7th Company, to counterattack. The leader of the
Fusilier Battalion, Major Reschke, with his staff
and a few Fusiliers, was soon in the fight. With the
last remnants of his men – almost all wounded –
he was captured after desperate resistance. The
leadership of his orphaned Battalion was taken
over by Lieutenant Baron von Richthofen. Further
south the counterattacking riflemen – parts of the
7th and 10th Companies – succeeded in fierce
hand grenade combat to drive back the enemy
some 100 metres and repelled his advance.
Next to Captain Kroeber, the leader of the 2nd
Battalion, his adjutant, Lieutenant Uhlhorn, was
badly injured. He died of his wounds a few days
later in a field hospital. From 2000 hours on the
reserves of the regimental commander, Major
Baron von Rotenhan, the 9th Company and the
Machine Gun Reserve from Drocourt, arrived and
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in a bloody engagement consolidated the position,
so that the eastern slope of the ridge would be
held. Directly in front of the Riflemen rose the
ruins of the small palace of la Folie.
Lieutenant Kopka, who, with the 2nd Machine Gun
Company of the 261st Regiment was stationed in
Vimy as a brigade reserve, put themselves at the
disposition of the 262nd Regiment, and in the
biggest danger. Kopka was shot in the head in
the forward line. The constantly endangered left
wing of the Regiment swayed completely in the air.
Through their tenacious will, the steadfast 262nd
succeeded in defiantly maintaining it against all
the onslaughts.
On the right wing of the Division, the 261st Reserve
Infantry Regiment held firmly. The clattering fire
of the few undestroyed machine guns came out of
the trenches and craters and the riflemen wildly,
some standing, shot at the enemy. The bloody
attack broke down in front of the Regiment. But
strong danger threatened on the wings. From
Section Zollern blazed a flood from the south
towards the left wing of the Fusilier Battalion,
which threatened to roll it up in the back. The
battalion commander, Major von Knobelsdorff
sent forward his reserves, the 10th and parts of
the 12th Companies, in a powerful counterattack.
They sealed off the enemy breakthrough
towards the south with heavy losses. Lieutenant
Koschmieder was hit by a deadly shot, as he
brought a machine gun into position. Next to
him many brave riflemen coloured the ground
with their blood. However, the few remaining
combat-ready officers, NCOs and fusiliers held
the newly-won position tenaciously. Captured
Lewis guns strengthened their fire power. Also in
the north, after the explosion of powerful mines,
the enemy penetrated Section Doberitz, which
neighboured on the right, and with strong forces
swung to the south, threatening encirclement.
The right wing of the 1st Battalion stood for hours
in bitter close combat against ever-new arms.
Lieutenant Klabisch fell doing this in the middle
of his faithful followers. A counterattack launched
by the Battalion leader, Captain Zickner with his
reserves of the 2nd and 4th Companies, drove
the English back in a bloody struggle. However,
the success was bought dearly. The brave leader
of the 4th Company, Lieutenant Retzlick, and his
platoon leader Lieutenant Lehmann, with many
Grenadiers sealed their loyalty with their deaths.

Still the Regiment, with its middle – the remnants
of the 3rd, 1st, 11th and 9th Companies – like
a sandbar in the surging sea, securely held the
forward trenches. But the continued attempts of
the Canadians, with always-new forces, blasted
the wedge of the 261st and the strength of the
defender continued to fade away. An English
grenadier group, whose grenades were flung
30-35 metres, surrounded Lieutenant Balla, the
commander of the 3rd Company in his crater;
the grenades of the German grenadiers flew only
15 metres. Their arms were paralysed! Only the
fire of a rifleman, lying with an armoured shield
in front of him, held the English back. He fired
for hours and after every shot repeated the short
exclamation “another one.” Close to Lieutenant
Balla in this fight fell the brave Vice-Sergeant
Stracke. Before midday an English airplane
appeared, which wanted to finish off the men
still fighting in the craters by bombing. In a lucky
stroke the Germans fired white flares at it. The
Englishman flew away without dropping his
bombs. White flares today were the identification
signal of his own troops for him.
In the afternoon reinforcements finally drew near.
Lieutenant von Goerne sent two platoons from
his last reserves, the 5th Company, to the Fusilier
Battalion, where, with their help, the connection
with the 262nd Regiment was secured. A short
pause in the battle allowed the many lightly
wounded to be sent back, and the badly wounded
were brought to the bunkers. All hearts, however,
were concerned with the anxious question, ‘where
is the counterattack by the strong reserves?’
During this battle the batteries of the Division
maintained, with all their strength, their
annihilating barrage until 1900 hours (some
until 2030 hours) with heavy losses; however, for
them the battle situation in the forward infantry
lines stayed unclear, and they had to keep to their
previous barrage fire zones. In Section Arnulf,
the batteries deployed were pulled into the close
combat. Many of their gun positions were west
of the embankment, and for some time they had
to fend off close range infantry attacks through
direct fire and with carbines and grenades. Under
enemy infantry fire, the 3rd and 8th Batteries
of the 63rd Regiment succeeded in bringing
their pieces back into position again east of the
embankment. The enemy had already worked
their way to the wire entanglement of the firing
79
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positions of the 1st and 6th Batteries of the 63rd
Regiment, who had to destroy their pieces after
the last shot left the barrels – an honourable
loss! Also two F-H Batteries – 10th and 11th of
the 10th Regiment – in the Section Zollern were
attacked by enemy infantry, in close combat,
however, they held their positions with their own
infantry support.

Deployment of the Reserves

A

s the heavy barrage continued to roar in
unsurpassed violence, the Brigade alerted
the resting battalions. The Division immediately
ordered the entire area to heightened combat
readiness. The divisional reserves – 2nd
Battalion, 261st (5th Company Regiment Reserve
in the “Lower slope position”), 1st Battalion,
262nd (2nd Company Regiment Reserve in and
around Vimy) and the 2nd Battalion, 263rd
(8th Company Regiment Reserve in Vimy,
Staff and 5th Company had not yet pulled out
of their previous front line positions) – were
moved closer to the battle zone. While they were
marching, news reached them that the enemy
had broken through to the south adjoining the
1st Bavarian Reserve Division and had taken the
first position. Soon the reconnaissance of the
Brigade and Division revealed that the enemy
had also broken through on the left wing of the
79th Reserve Division and was rolling up the
position to the north. Also north of the Division
was a supposedly successful breakthrough. The
Brigade ordered the Battalions, the 2nd/261st
under Captain von Goerne and the 2nd/263rd
under Lieutenant Heinecke, to march to the
embankment south of Vimy, with the instructions
that their Machine Gun Companies should push
ahead at a trot. The 2nd/262nd Battalion under
Major von Block pulled back as Division Reserve
to the crossroad network east of Vimy.
The first Machine Gun Company 261 arriving
from the onrushing reserves was deployed at
the embankment to strengthen the weak forces
of the 263rd Regiment and was greeted joyfully.
The totally exhausted 2nd Battalion of the
263rd followed them with the 6th Company of
the 261st and later a Company of the 262nd.
The other parts of the Brigade Reserve, the 7th
and 8th Companies of the 261st, as well as the
2nd Machine Gun Company of the 263rd, were
transferred by the Brigade to the 261st Regiment

with the Order that the second position must
be held under all circumstances and to make
contact with the 262nd Regiment. (After the
Radio and Light Signals that had been received
indicated that the enemy was already in the flank
and rear of the 262nd Regiment and a strong
response was needed or the 262nd Regiment
would not continue to exist.) The 2nd Machine
Gun Company of the 261st, lying as the Brigade
Reserve in Vimy, had independently placed itself,
as already mentioned above, at the disposition
of the 262nd Regiment. So at least the heavily
engaged fighting troops were guaranteed the most
urgent help. Unfortunately the weak reserves
did not suffice for a swift counterattack to reestablish the positions immediately.
Towards midday, High Command ordered the
Division to retake the Third Line which had
been lost. Also, the imminent arrival of two
fresh battalions – the 1st/118th (56th Field
Division) and the 3rd/34th Regiment (80th
Reserve Division) was announced. General von
Bacmeister, who in the meantime had gained
a reasonably clear picture of the battlefield
position,3 decided at this point to fill the wide
gaping hole between the 262nd Regiment and
the 1st Bavarian Reserve Division by retaking the
Telegraph heights through a counterattack. To
accomplish this, von Bacmeister gave the Brigade
the 1st/118th and a Company of Machine Gun
Section 20 for this purpose.
Since 1340 hours the Brigade staff was located
on the crossroad network east of Vimy To
carry out the Brigade’s order, Major von Block
appointed Lieutenant von Behr to lead the
counterattack and allocated him the 1st/118th,
the 1st/262nd (without two Companies) and a
Company of Machine Gun Section 20. Starting
from the Foundry area (north of Vimy), the
counterattack was to proceed forward along
the Lens-Arras road and attack the Telegraph
heights to join with the 262nd Regiment to the
right. Lieutenant Heinecke with the forces of the
263rd Regiment lying on the embankment were
to advance against the Telegraph heights south
of Vimy, to connect with the attack of von Block,
and on the left keep in contact with the assault
troops of the 1st Bavarian Reserve Division. The
artillery prepared the counterattack by firing
on the ridge north of Thélus. The attacking
battalions met at 1600 hours on the ridge east
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Top right: German prisoners captured by
Canadian forces during the Battle for Vimy
Ridge. These men display an assortment of
headgear, including soft field caps, knitted
toques, M1916 steel helmets, and in at least one
case, a Canadian trench helmet! The impact of
the wartime ersatz economy is also evident, as
some of the Germans wear puttees rather than
the more expensive leather marching boots.
Centre: German prisoners are marched to the
rear after being captured at Vimy Ridge, April
1917. The prisoners are under guard of two
mounted Canadian soldiers, and several local
civilians have come out of their houses to catch
a glimpse of the enemy.
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of Vimy, and in order to avoid the ever
increasing English shellfire had to go
over the shallow trenches. Only towards
1800 hours did Major von Block’s
troops stride through Vimy. After the
expulsion of the Canadians from the
ruins of the village in the late evening,
darkness and snowstorms hindered
a rapid continuation of the attack.
The second position was reached
and the right made contact with the
left wing of the 262nd Regiment and
supported itself on its left on the Forest
of la Comte. The counterattack from
the troops advancing on the left from
the embankment made slow progress,
and the shock troops of the 1st Bavarian
Reserve Division were still a long way to
the rear, advancing southward. They
stayed locked on the military route from
Vimy to Farbus under heavy artillery
fire, from where they were finally pulled
back to the embankment by their
Regimental commander. Overnight, in
the midst of the snowstorms, all contact
stopped. As the Brigade regrouped for
battle the next day, the 3rd Battalion
of the 34th Regiment (without two
Companies) along with several machine
guns transferred from the Division were
put at the disposal of Lieutenant von
Behr. This allowed the occupation of
the south side of Vimy so that contact
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Bottom right: German prisoners captured at
Vimy are marched away from the battlefield
under the watchful eyes of Allied soldiers and
local children.
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Close of the First Great Day of Battle

A

t the fall of darkness on Vimy Ridge, the
Canadians, deploying strong forces with
renewed power, continueed their attack against
the projecting wedge of the 261st Regiment.
A furious close-quarters battle erupted, in which
many of the best fell. As the last grenades were
thrown, and the last cartridges shot, the local
commanders decided to pull back to the next
position. However, hardly had the last fighters
leapt out of the craters to reach their objective,
when they were hit by the sudden fire of the
English guns and were destroyed. Some were
taken into English captivity. The fate of one
valiant soldier captures the conclusion of the
drama. After, with a heavy heart, he had given the
order to pull back from the great self-sacrificing
position, in the deepening darkness Lieutenant
Balla fell into a large water filled shell crater.
To save himself from drowning, he clung with
his last strength to the side, incapable without
outside help of freeing himself from the mud. In
this position the completely exhausted man was
found by the English and captured.
Only a few found their way back to bring news of
the conclusion of the heroic battle.
Through the deployment of the last strength of
the 261st Regiment, the intermediate position on
the eastern slope of the ridge was held. The first
relief was the full-strength 3rd Company of the
18th Pioneer Battalion, which was sent in during
the night by the Brigade.
On the front of the 262nd Regiment, the fierce
battles continued in the night as well. An energetic
advance by Lieutenant von Richthofen drove back
the English, winning back ground. The battle

raged especially violently on the left wing of the
Regiment, until the danger of its encirclement was
averted by the advance of Captain von Block. In
the morning, the arrival of a Company of the 34th
Reserve Infantry Regiment brought further relief.
The dwindling munitions in the battle front,
such as grenades, flares and barbed wire were
replenished during the night in the northern
sector from the Betricourt Munitions Depot
through the Embankment supply line; and in the
southern section through trucks, which like the
former, unloaded under fierce fire.
Like the infantry, who were struggling with
all their strength, the artillery batteries of the
Division also suffered heavy losses. On the
evening of 9 April, only 17 artillery pieces from
12 field batteries were still operational. Due to
the combat situation, they were concentrated
into two Groups; Group North under Major von
Bressentin and Group South under Captain
Doering. Three of the Batteries of the 63rd
Regiment, which had been withdrawn from the
battlefield to the west of the Embankment, went
into position by the Brigade Command Post at
the crossroads. The Division transferred the
3rd Battery of the 25th Field Artillery to them.
Major von Bressentin moved his command post
on the embankment to the 2nd/63rd, where on
the morning of 10 April the Staff of the 261st
and 262nd Regiments followed him. Captain
Doering went to the crossroads, where the staff of
the 263rd Regiment and the heavy artillery were
in close proximity. This allowed the Brigade4 to
direct the infantry battle in direct contact with
the artillery groups.
On the order of the Division, the English Battery
positions by Neuville St. Vaast were hit with gas
munitions and the villages of les Tilleuls, Thélus
and Farbus as well as the streets leading to the
German lines were subjected to heavy fire.
In the meantime, thanks to the heroic resistance
of the fighting troops, the crisis of the battle
was overcome. Already in the late evening two
Battalions of the approaching 111th Field
Division had arrived to occupy the third line by
Acheville and Arleux. They were followed on 10
April by the other units of this Division, which
were available to the General Command, and
pulled back to the third position in the Town
Bivouac. In the early morning the 2nd Battalion
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could be established with Group von Block. In
spite of great difficulties, such as heavy fire and
gas attack from Vimy, this was carried out by the
morning by the brave troops. However, there was
still a wide, gaping hole to the left of the adjoining
Division, which was not closed in the darkness.
To deal with this, the Brigade transferred a
Company of the 34th Regiment as well as two
Pioneer Mining Companies of the 263rd Regiment
from the newly-arrived reserves to strengthen
their left wing.
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of the 73rd and the 3rd Battalion of the 164th
were placed at the disposition of the 79th Reserve
Division and immediately transferred to the
Brigade, where they were eagerly awaited and
arrived at the crossroads around 1000 hours.
They were immediately sent forward, each with
two Companies and several machine guns, to
the reinforce the exhausted forward units. The
Brigade kept as a Reserve half of the 3rd/164th,
which together with eight machine guns were
placed on stand-by for the protection of the left
flank of the Division.

The Battle for the Newly-Won
Defensive Front

A

fter the breakthrough, the German
battlefront now ran in a bend from the
western edge of Givenchy over the eastern
edge of Vimy Ridge, then south of Vimy to the
Embankment, from there south of Bailleul
curving to the east along the western edge of the
towns Gavrelle–Monchy–Wancourt. On both sides

of the Scarpe the urgent danger was overcome
through the new deployment of old established
Divisions. Fresh battalions and batteries gave
further support to the overall defence by the
occupation of rear lines. So that on 10 April new
attempts at a breakthrough by the enemy no
longer posed a serious threat. In the afternoon an
English attack using tanks in the Bailleul-Farbus
sector fell apart under heavy defensive fire. A
breakthrough attempt south of the Scarpe met
a similar fate.
Towards evening brisk fighting raged on Vimy
Ridge, whose eastern edge was temporarily
lost despite brave resistance. However, it was
recaptured through an immediate counterattack.
Overall, the dedication of the other divisional
troops cannot be praised enough. Lieutenants
Florenz and Schnioffsky from the 261st Regiment
with many brave NCOs and men were killed.
Lieutenant Wiese from the same Regiment was
heavily wounded and taken into English captivity.
He died from his wounds on 17 May.

A Canadian officer inspects the breech-block of
German 21 cm howitzer that had been firing from a
reverse slope position at Vimy Ridge.
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T

he Infantry of the 79th Reserve Division
stood, for many days and nights, in snow,
cold and mud, without enough sustenance and
sleep, in the great battle. Their fighting strength
was strained to the utmost and was soon
completely exhausted. The General Command
decided therefore, by relinquishing the still held
eastern edge of Vimy Ridge, to pull back the
remnants of the battalions of the 79th Reserve
Division on the night of 11 April and to deploy
more troops from the 111th Infantry Division
in the Vimy position. Under the direction of the
Brigade, the relief of the Infantry of the 79th
Reserve Division was carried out after the arrival
in the night of the 2nd Battalion of the 76th
Regiment and Staff and the 2nd Battalion of
the 164th. Before dawn on 11 April, with great
difficulty, the sectors were newly remanned and
the relieved Battalions pulled back. Only a weak
force of the 262nd Regiment, which could not
pull back before daylight, remained in Section
Zollern on the eastern edge of the freshly snow
covered Vimy Ridge. On 11 April they held their
forward position, which was threatened from all
sides, with the greatest dedication. Finally, after
the long heroic battle, on the night of 12 April
the last soldiers followed orders and cleared the
blood-drenched ridge.
The battle line of the 79th Reserve Division now
ran along the 2nd position, on the southwest
corner of Vimy curving back to the Embankment.
After the relief of its infantry, the Division
Commander, the Brigade Commander and the
Sector Commanders of the 79th Reserve Division
retained command over their previous sectors
and the newly-deployed troops of the 111th
Field Division. On the night of 11 April with the
surrender of Vimy Ridge, the last batteries west of
the Embankment were pulled back. Some moved
to the vicinity of the crossroads, while the rest
took up new firing positions behind the 3rd line.
An English attack on 11 April against Vimy was
broken up by the lively fire of our batteries. This
artillery fire was used to disrupt the enemy’s
advance, interdict the roads and hinder his
observation from the ridge. On the evening of 11
April, 22 field and 12 heavy guns fired in front
of the 3rd line.

On this day the main attack of the English was
launched along the Arras-Cambrai road. With
overwhelming artillery fire and the deployment
of large numbers of tanks, they occupied the
village of Monchy.
The overall general situation had now developed,
so that the Army Group decided, in order to
achieve bearable conditions, to break off the
defence of the enemy and to withdraw the forward
fighting troops to the line Lens-Avion-MericourtAcheville-Arleux-Oppy-Gavrelle. The guns of the
artillery were withdrawn behind this line on the
night of 12 April. However, the 79th Reserve
Division still supplied the Infantry Brigade with
two Field Batteries east of Vimy to support the
nearby battle. As the morning of 13 April came,
the withdrawing German positions were cleared
from Lièvin over Vimy to Gavrelle. Only a weak
rearguard stayed behind and it retreated at the
first enemy pressure.
Command of the section of the 79th Reserve
Division went over to the 111th Field Division.
On 14 April the batteries of the 63rd Regiment
were also pulled out of the battle.
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The Echelon Retirement of the 79th
Reserve Division from the Battle

*****

T

he fierce battle for Vimy Ridge was fought
to a standstill. To be able call oneself a “Vimy
fighter,” was from then on a high honour!
With justice the Division Commander could
extend his thanks and highest recognition in front
of the assembled troops.
But in the hearts of the fighters and their
loved ones, who restlessly, with deep yearning
lived through it all in the Homeland, the memory
of the days of heroic glory and deepest sorrow
glows indelibly at the Battle of Vimy Ridge, that
patch of earth sanctified by the rivers of noble
blood and uncountable heroic graves.
Notes

1.

2.

The Brigade Command Post was not completed by 9
April , at the start of the battle, due to the shortage
of manpower. The Brigade Commander and his staff
therefore set up in the deserted shelter of an anti-aircraft
platoon near the road network.
At the end of April 1917, the London News reported
that in the 1st week of the Vimy offensive twice as much
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A Canadian soldier contemplates a German gun emplacement that
appears to have sustained a direct hit from Allied artillery fire.

3.

4.

artillery munitions were fired than in the first week of
the Somme and in the second week of Vimy six and a
half times as much as in the second week of the Somme.
At this place praise must go to the outstanding work
of the Radio and Light signal stations, as much as the
devotion of the brave messengers is stressed, who, even
in the heaviest fire, kept safe the Battle orders. A Light
signal station, which was built into the east slope of Vimy
Ridge, still sent important messages until 11 April.
In a place of honour in my room hangs one of the
masterly drawings from the, then freed, von Wiens,

depicting the 6th Company of the 261st Regiment on
the Vimy Ridge on the night of 9/10 April. The picture
conveys with vivid clarity, that which I saw, standing next
to the battle position, in the same night: the ridge west
of Vimy, the ruins of the village and the Embankment,
half-left in front of him the Windmill, everywhere the
activity of the fighting troops and the stretcher-bearers
is lit up like lightning by the fire of exploding grenades
and shrapnel.
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